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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellees Maureen and John Mirabella petitioned their 
local government for assistance in a dispute with their 
neighbors and, at the same time, threatened the local 
government with litigation.  A local official responded, via 
email, by barring the Mirabellas from communicating directly 
with any members of the local government, other than its 
counsel.  Local officials also threatened to move for sanctions 
against the Mirabellas for frivolous litigation if they filed suit.   
 
 The Mirabellas allege that the government officials 
violated their First Amendment rights in two ways: (1) by 
retaliating against the Mirabellas for the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights and (2) by violating the Mirabellas’ First 
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances.  As to these claims, the District Court denied the 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied qualified 
immunity.  The government officials now appeal on qualified 
immunity grounds.  For the reasons below, we conclude that 
the Mirabellas have adequately alleged both a retaliation 
claim and a violation of their right to petition.  The rights 
allegedly violated, however, were not clearly established for 
the purpose of qualified immunity.  Therefore, we are 
constrained to reverse.  
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I1 
 
 This case arises out of a dispute between the 
Mirabellas and their neighbors regarding a public wetlands 
abutting their properties.  The wetlands is owned by 
Montgomery Township, Pennsylvania.  The Mirabellas allege 
that their neighbors extended their backyards into the public 
wetlands by attempting to fence in the open space, placing 
playground equipment there and landscaping it.   
 
 The Mirabellas complained to the Township, which 
removed the fence, required the neighbors to move their 
playground equipment and—initially—required the neighbors 
to stop landscaping the open space.  Nevertheless, the 
Mirabellas allege, the neighbors continued to “cut and clear” 
the open space “using driving mowers, weed whackers, push 
mowers, chainsaws and other means.”  App. 39.  The 
Mirabellas continued to complain about this, but the 
Township ultimately reversed course and gave the neighbors 
permission to mow the open space. 
 
 The Mirabellas viewed the Township’s response as 
overly permissive and environmentally destructive.  For these 
reasons, the Mirabellas—who are both attorneys—notified 
the Township Board of Supervisors by email that they 
intended to sue their neighbors for “encroachment and 
destruction” of the open space.  App. 119.  The Mirabellas 
protested “the Board’s failure to . . . protect our natural open 
                                              
 1  We recite the facts only as necessary for the 
purposes of this appeal, which involves a single count of a 
nine-count complaint.  The only remaining defendants are 
Appellants Joseph Walsh and Jeffrey McDonnell.  
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spaces,” which put them “in the position of having to sue 
neighbors in order to see that our environment is preserved.”  
Id.  The Mirabellas further stated that as the owner of the 
open space, “the Township will be an indispensable party in 
this litigation.”  Id.  Walsh and McDonnell interpreted this as 
a threat that the Mirabellas would sue the Township.   
 
 On the same day the Mirabellas ostensibly threatened 
litigation, the Township responded.  Appellant Joseph Walsh, 
Chairperson of the Board of Supervisors, wrote to the 
Montgomery Township Solicitor and copied the Mirabellas.  
Walsh wrote that “[i]f the Township is sued by the Mirabellas 
make sure our insurance counsel motions the court for 
sanctions . . . as they have no standing to file such a frivolous 
action.”  App. 121.  Another member of the Board of 
Supervisors, Appellant Jeffrey McDonnell, concurred later 
that evening.  He wrote: “I agree. I would also suggest our 
[attorney] put them on notice now that we will seek 
san[c]tions so there’s no surprise.”  App. 126.   
 
 John Mirabella replied within minutes defending the 
potential lawsuit as non-frivolous.  He requested that the 
Board of Supervisors provide “any legal authority to support 
the Board’s decision and your claim that we do not have 
standing.”  App. 123.   
 
 Later that night, at 11:26 p.m., Walsh replied from his 
iPhone.  Walsh’s email—later an impetus for the Mirabellas’ 
First Amendment claims—stated: 
 
Dear Mr[.] Mirabella and his wife attorney.  
Please direct all further communications to the 
Township attorney.  Please never contact me, 
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the Board of Supervisors or the Township 
employees directly.  Do not call me at work, 
email me at work or speak to me in public or 
private.  The dye is caste [sic].   
 
App. 125 (emphasis added).  Walsh copied this “no contact”2 
email to numerous Township officials, including the Board of 
Supervisors, Township Manager, Planning and Zoning 
Director and members of the police department.   
 
 Thereafter, the Mirabellas attended one meeting of the 
Board of Supervisors, at which they allegedly protested the 
destruction of the open space and expressed their “dismay and 
anger” over Walsh and McDonnell’s emails.  App. 45.   
 
 The Mirabellas filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, alleging, inter alia, violations of their First 
Amendment rights.  The defendants filed motions to dismiss 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in which they 
asserted a qualified immunity defense.  The District Court 
dismissed all of the Mirabellas’ claims except for certain First 
Amendment claims against Walsh and McDonnell.   
 
 In its opinion, the District Court construed the 
Mirabellas’ surviving First Amendment claims as alleging 
                                              
 2  The term “no contact” is used to refer to a rule of 
professional conduct, prohibiting contact with a represented 
person, regarding the subject of the representation, absent 
consent or legal authority.  2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., 
The Law of Lawyering § 39.01 (4th ed. 2016).  We discuss 
Pennsylvania’s rule in more detail below.  See infra 
Part IV(A)(3). 
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two violations: (1) retaliation against the Mirabellas for the 
exercise of their First Amendment rights to free speech and to 
petition the government for redress of grievances and (2) a 
direct violation of the Mirabellas’ First Amendment right to 
petition the government.  As to both claims, the District Court 
found that the Mirabellas had pled a constitutional violation.  
The District Court denied qualified immunity via a very brief 
analysis.  Walsh and McDonnell now appeal, alleging that 
they are entitled to qualified immunity on both claims.   
 
II 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over the District 
Court’s denial of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and the collateral order doctrine.  L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 
836 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2016).  The qualified immunity 
issue before us is solely a question of law and is, therefore, 
immediately appealable as a final order.  Zaloga v. Borough 
of Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 174 n.3 (3d Cir. 2016).  We exercise 
plenary review.  L.R., 836 F.3d at 241.  As this is an appeal 
from the denial of a motion to dismiss, we accept the 
allegations in the complaint as true.  Mammaro v. New Jersey 
Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 166 (3d Cir. 
2016).    
 
III 
 
 “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials 
from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing 
(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, 
and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of 
the challenged conduct.”  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
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735 (2011) (citation omitted).  “A Government official’s 
conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of 
the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] 
sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have 
understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’”  Id. at 
741 (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).   
 
 To determine if a right is clearly established, we first 
look for Supreme Court precedent.  Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 
169.  If there is none, we may rely on a “‘robust consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority’ in the Court[s] of Appeals.”  Id. 
(quoting Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per 
curiam)).  “[A]lthough earlier cases involving fundamentally 
similar facts can provide especially strong support for a 
conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not 
necessary to such a finding.”  L.R., 836 F.3d at 248 (quoting 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).   
 
 We exercise our discretion to decide which of the two 
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to address first “in 
light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”  
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  For reasons 
of constitutional avoidance, we may begin by determining 
whether a right was clearly established.  Camreta v. Greene, 
563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011).  Yet in other cases “following the 
two-step sequence—defining constitutional rights and only 
then conferring immunity—is sometimes beneficial to clarify 
the legal standards governing public officials.”  Id. at 707.   
 
 In the Mirabellas’ case, we exercise our discretion to 
follow the two-step sequence.  We do so in order to guide 
local officials in safeguarding the First Amendment rights of 
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constituents in challenging circumstances: when the 
government’s constituents are also litigation adversaries.  
See Am. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. City of St. Albans, 18 
F. Supp. 2d 620, 621 (S.D.W.Va. 1998) (observing that the 
“[g]overnment remains the servant of the people, even when 
citizens are litigating against it”).  
 
IV 
 
  The Mirabellas allege—in the first of two claims on 
appeal—that local officials Walsh and McDonnell retaliated 
against them for the exercise of their First Amendment rights.  
We conclude that the Mirabellas have pled a retaliation claim 
based upon Walsh’s “no contact” email, but not Walsh and 
McDonnell’s threat that they would move for litigation 
sanctions.  As to the second prong of qualified immunity, we 
conclude that the right was not clearly established.   
 
A 
 
 “Official reprisal for protected speech ‘offends the 
Constitution [because] it threatens to inhibit exercise of the 
protected right.’”  Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 
(2006) (citation omitted).  To plead retaliation for the exercise 
of First Amendment rights, a plaintiff must allege “(1) 
constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action 
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link 
between the constitutionally protected conduct and the 
retaliatory action.”  Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 
(3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Mack v. Warden 
Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 297 (3d Cir. 2016) (applying this 
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test to a claim of retaliation for the exercise of the right to 
petition).    
  
1 
 
 The first element of the Mirabellas’ retaliation claim is 
straightforward.  The parties do not dispute that the 
Mirabellas exercised their First Amendment rights—both 
their right to free speech and their right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.  The Mirabellas 
engaged in constitutionally protected speech and petitioning 
when they protested the Township’s failure to protect the 
open space and threatened litigation.  “Both the Free Speech 
Clause and the Petition Clause protect ‘personal 
expression’—both expression generally and expression 
directed towards the government for the specific purpose of 
asking it to right a wrong.”  Mack, 839 F.3d at 297-98.3    
 
2 
 
 As to the second element of the retaliation claim, the 
parties dispute whether there was a retaliatory act “sufficient 
to deter a person of ordinary firmness.”  Thomas, 463 F.3d at 
296.  We conclude that Walsh’s “no contact” email met this 
                                              
 3  We will discuss the First Amendment right to 
petition the government in greater detail below, in the context 
of the Mirabellas’ second claim, which alleges a direct 
violation of their right to petition.  As explained below, the 
right to free speech and the right to petition are not 
necessarily coextensive, although this is immaterial to our 
analysis of the Mirabellas’ retaliation claim.  See infra 
Part V(A). 
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standard, but that Walsh and McDonnell’s threat that they 
would move for litigation sanctions did not.4   
 
 As a preliminary matter, we reject Walsh and 
McDonnell’s argument that the second element cannot be 
satisfied because the Mirabellas were undeterred in the 
exercise of their constitutional rights and, for example, 
attended one meeting of the Board of Supervisors after Walsh 
sent the “no contact” email.  This argument fails because 
whether an act is retaliatory is an objective question.  Bistrian 
v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012).  We ask whether 
the act would deter a person of ordinary firmness, not whether 
the plaintiff was deterred.  There is good reason for such a 
rule: we will not “‘reward’ government officials for picking 
on unusually hardy speakers.  At the same time, we recognize 
that government officials should not be liable when the 
plaintiff is unreasonably weak-willed . . . .”  Bennett v. 
Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation 
omitted).  We now consider the two retaliatory acts alleged.  
 
 
 
                                              
 4  At this level, we construe Walsh and McDonnell’s 
actions as being made “under color of state law” for the 
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  This requirement can be met 
where the defendant either: (1) acts in his or her official 
capacity or (2) “purports to act according to official power.”  
Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Construing the allegations in the Mirabellas’ favor, 
Walsh and McDonnell either acted or purported to act, 
respectively, as chairperson and member of the Board of 
Supervisors. 
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i 
 
 The first allegedly retaliatory act is Walsh’s “no 
contact” email.  In this email, Walsh prohibited the 
Mirabellas from contacting government employees, as 
follows: “Please direct all further communications to the 
Township attorney.  Please never contact me, the Board of 
Supervisors or the Township employees directly.  Do not call 
me at work, email me at work or speak to me in public or 
private.  The dye is caste [sic].”  App. 125.  Construing all 
inferences in favor of the Mirabellas, we agree with the 
District Court that this email “is significantly more than a 
direction to contact the town attorney regarding the 
[threatened] lawsuit.  This is a complete prohibition against 
Plaintiffs contacting town officials and employees for any 
reason.”  App. 17.  In short, Walsh barred the Mirabellas from 
communicating directly with their local government, for any 
reason, indefinitely.  This prohibition was “sufficient to deter 
a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
constitutional rights.”  Thomas, 463 F.3d at 296.   
 
 In concluding that Walsh’s “no contact” email was 
retaliatory, we draw upon and distinguish a similar First 
Amendment retaliation case decided by the Second Circuit.  
In Tuccio v. Marconi, a real estate developer filed a lawsuit 
against a town where he sought to do business.  589 F.3d 538, 
540 (2d Cir. 2009).  Because of this pending lawsuit, town 
officials refused to meet with the developer in person, and 
advised him to communicate with them in writing.  The 
developer then filed a second lawsuit, alleging that the town 
officials’ refusal to meet with him was retaliatory.  After a 
trial on the retaliation claim, judgment was entered for the 
town and the Second Circuit affirmed.  The Second Circuit 
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held that the town’s decision not to meet with the 
developer—a litigation adversary—was not a retaliatory act.  
Id. at 541-42.  In reaching this conclusion, Tuccio emphasized 
that the developer “had no business with the Town” other 
than the lawsuit.  Id. at 541.  Tuccio further explained that 
“the result might be different” if the prohibition had “been 
implemented in a manner that effectively denied Tuccio 
access to permits or opportunities to do business with the 
Town,” but that the trial record demonstrated that this had not 
occurred.  Id.   
 
 The result is different in the Mirabellas’ case, because 
unlike the developer in Tuccio, the Mirabellas have alleged 
“business with” their local government.  Id.  The Mirabellas 
live in Montgomery Township and have alleged a myriad of 
interests, for which they may petition the Township.  Walsh’s 
email bars the Mirabellas from communicating with 
Township employees about any topic, not only the threatened 
litigation, as to which limits on communication might have 
been “prudent.”  Id. at 542.  Thus, we conclude that Walsh’s 
“no contact” email was a retaliatory act.5      
 
                                              
 5  Our analysis of the Mirabellas’ retaliation claim does 
not turn on whether Walsh’s “no contact” email was itself 
unconstitutional.  In a retaliation claim, we ask instead 
“whether the Government is punishing the plaintiffs for 
exercising their rights.”  Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 148 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson v. 
Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997)).  We will return to 
the constitutionality of Walsh’s “no contact” email in the 
context of the Mirabella’s direct Petition Clause claim.  
See infra Part V(B). 
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ii 
 
 The Mirabellas also allege that both Walsh and 
McDonnell retaliated against them by stating that if the 
Mirabellas sued the Township, the Township would move for 
sanctions for frivolous litigation.  Significantly, this alleged 
act of retaliation is a particular kind—one taking the form of 
the official’s own speech.  McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 
566, 573 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Suarez Corp. Indus. v. 
McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 687 (4th Cir. 2000)); see also 
Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 176.  In such circumstances we employ a 
more specific test to determine whether the official’s speech 
amounts to a retaliatory act.  We ask whether there was “a 
threat, coercion, or intimidation, intimating that punishment, 
sanction, or adverse regulatory action will follow.”  
McLaughlin, 271 F.3d at 573 (quoting Suarez Corp. Indus., 
202 F.3d at 687).   
 
 This standard is not met by Walsh and McDonnell’s 
statements that if the Mirabellas sued the Township, they 
would move a court for sanctions.  In such statements, the 
“quantum of governmental authority brought to bear” was 
minimal.  R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 
735 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Novoselsky v. Brown, 
822 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that there was no 
retaliatory act where government official filed an attorney 
disciplinary complaint against the plaintiff and publicly 
accused him of litigiousness).  As such, the Mirabellas’ 
retaliation claim must succeed, if at all, on Walsh’s “no 
contact” email, not the threat of motioning for litigation 
sanctions.   
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3 
 
 The third element of a retaliation claim requires a 
causal link between a plaintiff’s constitutionally protected 
activity and the retaliatory act.  Thomas, 463 F.3d at 296.  
The required link is “but-for” causation.  Hartman, 547 U.S. 
at 256.  “[A]ny . . . plaintiff charging official retaliatory 
action . . . must prove the elements of retaliatory animus as 
the cause of injury, and the defendant will have the 
. . . opportunity to respond to a prima facie case by showing 
that the action would have been taken anyway, independently 
of any retaliatory animus.”  Id. at 260-61.  One method of 
proving a causal link, applicable here, is “unusually 
suggestive temporal proximity.”  Lauren W. v. Deflaminis, 
480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Mirabellas have 
alleged such a causal link.  On the very same day that the 
Mirabellas emailed the Township to protest its treatment of 
the open space, and to threaten litigation, Walsh responded 
with the “no contact” email.6   
 
 Although this “would normally be enough to carry a 
complaint across the starting line in the face of a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion,” we must address one counter-argument.  
Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 253 (1st Cir. 2014).  
                                              
 6  This allegation of temporal proximity is itself 
sufficient.  In addition, we infer that Walsh’s “no contact” 
email was a direct response to the threat of litigation because 
of Walsh’s concluding message, “[t]he dye is caste [sic].”  
App. 125.  Construing this statement in favor of the 
Mirabellas, we infer that Walsh meant that the Mirabellas cast 
the die by threatening litigation against the Township. 
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Walsh argues that there is “another explanation that is so 
obviously correct as to render the charge of improper 
motivation implausible.”  Id. (citation omitted); see also 
George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 586 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding 
that there was an alternative explanation (airline security) that 
was “obvious” on the fact of the complaint).  Specifically, 
Walsh contends that his email was merely a demand that the 
Mirabellas—both attorneys—follow the “no contact” rule of 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.  This 
argument fails because Walsh’s prohibition swept far more 
broadly than the rule.   
 
 Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides 
that a lawyer, representing a client, “shall not communicate 
about the subject of the representation with a person the 
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer 
or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.”  
Pa.R.P.C. 4.2.  This prohibition is narrower than Walsh’s “no 
contact” email, for at least three reasons: Rule 4.2 (1) is 
limited to the subject of the representation; (2) is limited to a 
person represented by counsel in the matter and (3) contains 
an “authorized by law” exception, which safeguards 
constitutionally-protected expression.  Id.; see also 
Pa.R.P.C. 4.2, cmt. ¶¶ 4, 5, 7.  Walsh’s “no contact” email 
contained none of these three limitations.7    
                                              
 7  We pass no judgment as to whether Rule 4.2 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct applies where, as 
here, lawyers represent themselves pro se.  See Hazard et al., 
supra note 2, § 41.03; Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 99, cmt. ¶ e (Am. Law Inst. 2016). 
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 Thus, we reject Walsh’s attempt to justify his email by 
reference to Rule 4.2.  The Mirabellas have pled causation, 
the final element of their First Amendment retaliation claim.  
 
B 
 
 Having held that the Mirabellas adequately alleged a 
First Amendment retaliation claim based upon Walsh’s “no 
contact” email, our inquiry is not complete.  We must 
nevertheless determine whether the right was clearly 
established under the second prong of qualified immunity.   
 
 In this analysis we are mindful that we must not 
“define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”  
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742.  More specifically, the Supreme 
Court has given us guidance on defining a right in the First 
Amendment retaliation context.  In Reichle v. Howards, the 
Supreme Court clarified that it is too broad to define the right 
as the “right to be free from retaliation for one’s speech.”  
132 S.Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012).  Conversely, Reichle held that is 
proper to define a right as the “right to be free from a 
retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by probable 
cause.”  Id.     
 
 Reichle is directly applicable to the Mirabellas’ 
retaliation claim.  As in Reichle, the disputed issue here is 
whether it was clearly established that the defendant’s act was 
retaliatory.8  Paralleling Reichle, we define the right at issue 
                                              
 8  In other First Amendment retaliation cases, the 
disputed issue may be whether it was clearly established that 
the plaintiff’s conduct was constitutionally protected.  See, 
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as the right to be free from a retaliatory restriction on 
communication with one’s government, when the plaintiff has 
threatened or engaged in litigation against the government.   
 
 This right was not clearly established when Walsh sent 
the “no contact” email.  The Mirabellas have identified 
neither Supreme Court precedent nor a “robust consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority.”  Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 169 
(citation omitted).  The closest case we have identified, 
Tuccio, held that the refusal of town officials to meet with a 
litigation adversary did not amount to First Amendment 
retaliation.  Tuccio, 589 F.3d at 541-42.  Thus, Walsh is 
entitled to qualified immunity on the Mirabellas’ First 
Amendment retaliation claim.   
 
V 
 
 The Mirabellas also assert a direct violation of their 
First Amendment right to petition the government for redress 
of grievances, again based upon Walsh’s “no contact” email.  
We conclude that the Mirabellas have pled a constitutional 
violation, but that the right was not clearly established for 
qualified immunity purposes.    
 
A 
 
 The First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, . . . or the right of the people 
. . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  
                                                                                                     
e.g., Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 993-94 
(3d Cir. 2014).  
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U.S. Const. amend. I.  These two guarantees are known, 
respectively, as the Speech Clause and the Petition Clause.   
 
 The right to petition the government is “one of ‘the 
most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of 
Rights.’”  BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524 
(2002) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. 
State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)).  “The very idea 
of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the 
part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in 
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of 
grievances.”  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 
(1875).  Petitioning serves numerous, fundamental interests of 
petitioners and the government alike.  It is “essential to 
freedom,” liberty and self-government.  Borough of Duryea v. 
Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 382, 394 (2011); see also 
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483 (1985).  Petitions 
contribute to the “public airing” of disputes, the “evolution of 
the law,” and the use of government as an “alternative to 
force.”  BE & K Constr., 536 U.S. at 532.   
 
 In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, the Supreme Court 
recently renewed its Petition Clause jurisprudence, with a 
focus on the historical underpinnings of the right.  564 U.S. at 
387-97; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reclaiming the 
Petition Clause 104-28 (2012) (chronicling the history of 
petitioning in the United States, including its importance in 
the abolitionist movement).  The Supreme Court described 
the “special concerns” of the Petition Clause, as compared to 
the Speech Clause, as follows: “The right to petition allows 
citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their 
government and their elected representatives, whereas the 
right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is 
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integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole 
realm of ideas and human affairs.”  Id. at 388 (emphasis 
added).   
 
 A petition may “undoubtedly” consist of a “personal 
grievance addressed to the government.”  Id. at 394.  But 
“[p]etitions to the government assume an added dimension 
when they seek to advance political, social, or other ideas of 
interest to the community as a whole.”  Id. at 395.  A petition 
need not “take[] a specific form,” and may include an oral 
grievance.  Mack, 839 F.3d at 299 (citation omitted). 
 
 A petition enjoys constitutional protection whether it is 
addressed, as here, to a local government, or to a state or 
national government.  See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889 (1982) (petition and 
boycott directed at county officials); Brown v. Louisiana, 
383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (protest of segregated public 
library); Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 519 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (oral request to city councilperson); Van Deelen v. 
Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2007) (appeal of 
county property tax assessment).  A petition may be directed 
towards any department of government, including the courts.  
Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 387; BE & K Constr., 536 U.S. at 525; 
see also Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d at 162-63 (holding that 
the right to petition includes actions taken in anticipation of 
litigation). 
 
 At the same time, the right to petition is not 
“[u]nrestrained,” Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 390, or “absolute,” 
McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484.  For example, the Supreme Court 
has held that “petitions to the President that contain 
intentional and reckless falsehoods ‘do not enjoy 
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constitutional protection.’”  McDonald, 472 U.S. at 484 
(citation omitted).  Accordingly, we may ask whether the 
government may “nevertheless burden” the right to petition, 
given countervailing government interests.  BE & K Constr., 
536 U.S. at 535.   
 
 To balance such competing interests, courts have 
generally applied Speech Clause precedent, rather than any 
freestanding Petition Clause doctrine.9  Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 
389 (acknowledging this trend); see also Galena v. Leone, 
638 F.3d 186, 197 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (considering speech and 
petition claims as one); Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 
385 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2004) (same).  But Guarnieri 
clarified that we cannot do so automatically.  For while the 
right to petition and the right to free speech “share substantial 
common ground,” they are not “identical in their mandate or 
their purpose and effect.”  Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 388.  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court cautioned that “Speech 
Clause precedents [do not] necessarily and in every case 
resolve Petition Clause claims.”  Id.  Despite this guidance, 
however, Guarnieri did apply Speech Clause precedent, 
rather than forge new ground under the Petition Clause.  Id. at 
382-83. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 9  That said, the Petition Clause has been interpreted 
independently from the Speech Clause in the antitrust context.  
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 
(1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
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B 
 
 With this background in mind, we turn to the 
Mirabellas’ claim that Walsh violated their right to petition by 
prohibiting them from contacting any Township employees, 
other than its counsel.  To answer this question, we will apply 
free speech precedent, as the Supreme Court did in Guarnieri.  
Id.  We conclude that this is appropriate given the “extensive 
common ground” of the two rights, and the Supreme Court’s 
own example.  Id. at 389.  As such, our analysis would be 
identical if the Mirabellas had framed their argument as a free 
speech claim, rather than a violation of their right to petition 
the government. 
 
1 
 
 Drawing upon free speech precedent, the Mirabellas 
encourage us to apply a test that is highly deferential to their 
First Amendment rights, on at least two theories.  First, the 
Mirabellas assert that Walsh’s email is a content-based 
restriction on their speech.  Cf. Nat’l Assoc. for the 
Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice (NAAMJP) v. 
Castille, 799 F.3d 216, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that 
speaker-based restrictions on speech are subject to heightened 
scrutiny when they reflect content-based preferences).  
Second, the Mirabellas assert that Walsh’s email is a 
restriction on their political speech.  See Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).   
 
 We decline to determine whether these theories apply.  
Rather, we will assume for the sake of argument that Walsh’s 
“no contact” email is a content-neutral, “time, place or 
manner” restriction on the Mirabellas’ speech.  It is 
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unnecessary to apply greater scrutiny to the restriction 
because, as explained below, even under a standard more 
deferential to Walsh, the “no contact” email is 
unconstitutional.  Cf. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 
2530 (2014) (recognizing cases that make such an 
assumption, but declining to adopt the same approach).   
 
 Given a content-neutral, “time, place or manner” 
restriction on speech, our inquiry is whether the prohibition is 
narrowly tailored.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 662 (1994); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 
791 (1989).  We ask whether the restriction “‘burden[s] 
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the 
government’s legitimate interests.’”  McCullen, 134 S.Ct. at 
2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).  The restriction need 
not be the least restrictive means of furthering the 
government’s interests.  Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798).  
However, the government may not restrict speech “in such a 
manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech 
does not serve to advance its goals.”  Id. (quoting Ward, 
491 U.S. at 799).  The restriction on speech must also “leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.  The government bears 
the burden to demonstrate that the restriction is 
constitutionally permissible.  Startzell v. City of Phila., 
533 F.3d 183, 201 (3d Cir. 2008).10  
                                              
 10  Although Walsh does not make the argument, we 
pause to explain that we are not applying another doctrine 
that would be even more deferential to the government.  This 
doctrine holds, in some contexts, that the government has 
“additional authority to regulate” attorney speech.  
In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 825 (3d Cir. 2013).  This 
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2 
 
 Applying the time, place or manner test, we begin with 
the alleged governmental interest.  Walsh alleges an interest 
in preventing the Mirabellas, litigation adversaries, from 
                                                                                                     
additional authority is a product of the government’s 
regulatory authority over bar admissions and attorney 
discipline.  See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 
1066 (1991).   
 
 Doctrinally, the regulation of certain attorney speech is 
one example of the government’s additional authority to 
restrict speech when it “acts in capacities that go beyond 
being sovereign.”  B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 
293, 303 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing In re Kendall, 712 
F.3d at 825).  That is, the law distinguishes between the 
government’s authority to restrict speech (1) as a “sovereign” 
or (2) as a “property owner, educator, employer, or patron.”  
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and 
the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers’ First 
Amendment Rights, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 569, 584-85 (1998).  
When the government acts as a sovereign, “robust free speech 
protection” applies.  Id. at 587.  But when the government 
acts in certain other capacities, it may be “freer to place 
conditions” on speech.  Id.   
 
 Walsh, we conclude, acted as a local “sovereign,” not 
by virtue of any regulatory authority over attorneys.  “When 
acting as sovereign, the government is empowered to impose 
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech . . . .”  B.H., 
725 F.3d at 302 (citing Ward, 492 U.S. at 791).  It is this 
standard that we apply.   
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communicating with Township employees per Rule 4.2 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.  That Rule, the 
commentary explains, “contributes to the proper functioning 
of the legal system,” for three reasons: (1) it protects 
represented persons from “possible overreaching by other 
lawyers” in the matter; (2) it protects the lawyer-client 
relationship from interference and (3) it prevents 
“uncounseled disclosure[s].”  Pa.R.P.C. 4.2, cmt. ¶ 1; see also 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, supra note 
7, § 99(A), cmt. ¶ b (same).  These governmental interests are 
legitimate.  But see Restatement (Third) of Law Governing 
Lawyers, supra note 7, § 101(A), cmt. ¶ b (suggesting that the 
need for a “no contact” rule is reduced where the represented 
person is a government entity). 
 
 As to the Mirabellas’ interests, they are substantial.  
Construing all inferences in their favor, the Mirabellas were 
prohibited from contacting Township officials and employees 
directly, for any reason, indefinitely.  This ban encompasses, 
inter alia, “normal conversation” and “one-on-one 
communication” with government officials—forms of 
expression “historically . . . closely associated with the 
transmission of ideas.”  McCullen, 134 S.Ct. at 2536.11 
 
                                              
 11  Walsh’s “no contact” email also substantially 
impairs the Mirabellas’ interests in petitioning the 
government.  Walsh prohibited the Mirabellas from 
“express[ing] their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their 
government and their elected representatives,” as the Petition 
Clause guarantees.  Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 388 (emphasis 
added). 
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 Comparing the parties’ interests, the Mirabellas have 
alleged a burden on their speech substantially greater than 
necessary to protect the Township’s litigation interests.  “[I]t 
is no answer . . . to say . . . that the purpose of these 
regulations was merely to insure high professional standards 
and not to curtail free expression.”  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
135 S.Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963)).12  Thus, the 
Mirabellas have alleged a constitutional violation of their 
right to petition. 
 
C 
 
 For the reasons above, the Mirabellas have alleged a 
violation of their First Amendment right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.  Under the second 
prong of qualified immunity, however, we conclude that the 
right was not clearly established.  
 
 As stated above, we must not “define clearly 
established law at a high level of generality.”  al-Kidd, 563 
U.S. at 742.  We therefore define the First Amendment right 
at issue as the right to be free from a restriction on 
communicating with one’s government, when the plaintiff has 
                                              
 12  Because we hold that Walsh’s “no contact” email 
was not narrowly tailored, we need not reach the additional 
requirement that a time, place or manner restriction on speech 
leave open ample alternative channels for communication.  
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; see, e.g., Johnson v. City & Cty. of 
Phila., 665 F.3d 486, 493 (3d Cir. 2011) (conducting this 
analysis).   
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threatened or engaged in litigation against the government.  
This right was not clearly established.   
 
 While other cases have held that there is a clearly 
established right to petition a local government, those cases 
did not involve litigation.  For example, the Sixth Circuit has 
held that there is a clearly established right “to petition a 
local, elected representative for assistance in dealing with 
local government agencies.”  Holzemer, 621 F.3d at 527.  
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that there is a clearly 
established right to petition a local government regarding a 
tax assessment.  Van Deelen, 497 F.3d at 1159.  These cases, 
while persuasive, do not establish that “every ‘reasonable 
official’” in Walsh’s position would have understood that his 
“no contact” email violated the Mirabellas’ First Amendment 
rights.  al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (citation omitted).  Thus, 
Walsh is entitled to qualified immunity on the Mirabellas’ 
Petition Clause claim.  
 
VI 
 
 For the reasons above, we will reverse the judgment of 
the District Court denying, in part, Appellant Walsh and 
McDonnell’s motion to dismiss and we will remand with 
instructions to enter judgment in their favor. 
